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0. Introduction
When you don’t know what to do, you’d better find out. Sometimes the best way to find out is to ask 
for advice. And when you don’t know what the right thing to do is, it’s sometimes good to rely on 
moral advice. So much should be uncontroversial.
Yet this straightforward thought spells serious trouble for a popular and widespread approach to 
moral worth: on this approach, agents deserve moral praise for a right action only if they are acting 
on right-making reasons.
e first part of this paper argues that cases of moral advice present right-making reasons accounts 
with a dilemma: depending on how we make the right-making relation precise, we either have to 
deny that agents who seek out and follow moral advice are morally praiseworthy or we have to 
credit morally wrong actions by unsavory characters with moral worth. is casts doubt on the claim 
that acting on right-making reasons can be both necessary or suﬃcient for moral worth. 
e second half of the paper explores an alternative proposal: what’s required for moral worth is 
moral knowledge. is idea has been unpopular in recent literature. My aim is to show that it 
deserves serious consideration.  
1. Moral Praise for Moral Advice
Not all right actions are morally praiseworthy. e politician delivering a huge check to a charity 
may well be doing something that is morally right – either because it’s something that he is morally 
required to do or because, even if not required, it’s something that’s morally good. But we are not 
inclined to give him moral credit for it. Whether an action has moral worth depends not just on the 
moral status of the action but also on the agent’s motivation. In the case of the politician we have 
reason to believe that his generosity stems from ulterior motives. His reasons for donating the 
money do not have anything to do with morality – they are purely self-interested. And so, it was a 
matter of luck that the politician did the right thing; morality and self-interest happened to align in 
this case. For an action to have moral worth, on the other hand, there must be a connection between 
the rightness of the action and the agent’s motivation. An account of moral worth aims to pin down 
what such moral motivation consists in.
An account of moral worth tells us how an agent must be motivated to be good. Morally perfect 
agents may always perform morally worthy actions but it’s not reasonable to think that only morally 
perfect agents perform morally worthy actions. We can be morally admirable for doing the right 
thing even when we fall short of moral perfection. is is something that a plausible account of 
moral worth should be able to accommodate. In this section, I present two examples of agents who 
compensate for their various moral limitations and who, as a result, succeed in doing the right thing.  
I argue that these agents are morally praiseworthy for their actions. 
Consider the following: 
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Ron is working for a charity. In response to a funding crisis, Ron needs to shut down one of two 
programs that the charity is running: X or Y. e two programs benefit diﬀerent individuals in 
very diﬀerent ways. Ron has spent the last couple of days researching the details and it’s time for 
him to make a decision. But although he has a wealth of information, he’s not sure what he 
should do. Diﬀerent factors point in conflicting directions: X is slightly more eﬃcient than Y 
but Y serves a more disadvantaged population, X focuses on education, while Y focuses on 
health, etc. Ron wants to do the right thing but he’s feeling overwhelmed by the number of 
considerations and the time pressure. He decides to ask his senior colleague who has worked in 
the field for many, many years; Ron admires her good sense and competence. Having looked 
over the details, she rightly advises Ron to end program X rather than Y. 
Ron relies on his colleague’s moral advice because he is not in a position to know what the right 
thing to do is on his own. Ron does have access to all the relevant nonmoral facts, but given his lack 
of experience, he is not sure how to weigh them. e fact that he needs to arrive at a decision 
quickly makes him anxious and this adds to his uncertainty. It would, of course, be better if Ron was 
in a position to discern what the right thing to do is himself. But given his moral limitation, relying 
on the moral advice of his more experienced colleague is a good thing. Moreover, when, following 
his colleague’s advice, he does the right thing and ends program X, it’s not just an accident that Ron 
managed to do what’s right. And so, it seems that Ron is morally praiseworthy for his right action.  
Here is a second case: 
Johanna is a teacher in an inner-city school who cares deeply about social justice and equality. 
While reviewing her teaching logs over the summer, however, she notices a disturbing trend: she 
realizes that when punishing disruptive behavior, she tends to resort to harsh measures much 
more quickly for black students than for white students. Johanna is horrified. She resorts to the 
following strategy: over the next year, whenever she encounters disruptive behavior, rather than 
deciding on the punishment on the spot, she runs the facts by an experienced and trustworthy 
colleague, without mentioning the student’s race. She then defers to the colleague’s advice about 
what kind of punishment would be fair. 
Johanna relies on her colleague’s moral advice because she is not in a position to know how to 
respond to her students’ behavior fairly. While she has access to all the relevant nonmoral facts, 
Johanna’s implicit bias prevents her from evaluating them correctly. It would, of course, be better if 
Johanna was simply in a position to recognize herself what the right way to respond is to a 
particular instance of disruptive behavior. But given her moral limitation, it seems like a very good 
thing that Johanna relies on her colleague’s advice rather than muddling through herself. Moreover, 
given that her colleague is sensible and reliable, it’s not an accident that Johanna ends up doing the 
right thing and, let’s suppose, send a particularly disruptive student to the principal’s oﬃce. And so, 
we should give Johanna moral credit for her right actions.
Johanna and Ron deserve moral praise for both seeking out and acting on their moral advice. Given 
that they are relying on sound moral advice, it’s not an accident that they succeed in doing what 
morality requires. In the next section I am going to argue that these cases present a challenge to 
accounts of moral worth on which moral worth is a matter of being motivated by right-making 
reasons. 
2. A Dilemma for Right-Making Reasons
A popular approach to moral worth has it that an action has moral worth only if it is ‘motivated by 
right-making reasons’. Most recently, variants of this approach have been defended by both Nomy 
Arpaly and Julia Markovits and my discussion will focus on their proposals. Arpaly argues: 
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For an agent to be morally praiseworthy for doing the right thing is for her to have done the 
right thing for the relevant moral reasons – that is, the reasons for which she acts are identical to 
the reasons for which the action is right.2 
Similarly, Markovits proposes: 
According to what I will call the Coincident Reasons esis, my action is morally worthy if and 
only if my motivating reasons for acting coincide with the reasons morally justifying the action – that 
is, if and only if I perform the action I morally ought to perform, for the (normative) reasons 
why it morally ought to be performed. 3
Right-making reasons accounts (RMR accounts) of moral worth have two central elements. One is 
a thesis in the philosophy of action about moral motivation. e second is a metaphysical thesis about 
what right-making reasons are. e RMR accounts agree, to a large degree, on the former – they 
diﬀer on the latter. Depending on what we take right-making reasons to be, then, I argue that cases 
of moral advice present RMR accounts with a dilemma: either actions on moral advice are ruled out 
from having moral worth, or actions that intuitively seem morally repugnant are ruled in. 
As for the first, moral motivation is taken to require being motivated by right-making reasons. To be 
motivated by a right-making reason F, F needs to appear in a rationalizing explanation of the agent’s 
action.4 Crucially, to be motivated by a right-making reason F, F must appear de re in the 
rationalizing explanation. is is to say, if the fact that aspirin will relieve your pain makes it right to 
give you some, then it must be the fact that aspirin will relieve your pain that explains my action. is 
is diﬀerent from being motivated by the fact that it would be right to relieve your pain or by the fact 
that aspirin would relieve your pain makes it right to give you some. It’s only in the former case that I’m 
motivated by right-making reasons de re. In the latter case, I’m motivated by moral considerations de 
dicto. 
But moral worth is not about being motivated by right-making reasons de dicto. It’s about being 
motivated by right-making reasons de re. us Markovits, argues: 
e Kantian ‘truly moral man’ seems guilty of a kind of moral fetishism (to borrow a phrase 
from Michael Smith), or at best, of having ‘one thought too many’ (to borrow one from Bernard 
Williams), if not plainly cold. A morally attractive person, objectors maintain, will help others 
not ‘because the moral law demands it’ but because they are in need of help.5
Similarly, here is Arpaly:
[M]oral worth is fundamentally about acting for moral reasons, not about acting for reasons 
believed or known to be such, and distinguishing the two is important in evaluating moral 
agents.6
is picture of moral motivation is widely accepted beyond the moral worth debate.7 In defending 
this account of moral motivation, Arpaly and Markovits both appeal to Smith, who argues:
Good people care non-derivatively about honesty, the weal and woe of their children and 
friends, the well-being of their fellows, [...] and not just one thing: doing what they believe to be 
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right, where this is read de dicto and not de re. Indeed, commonsense tells us that being so 
motivated is a fetish or moral vice not the one and only moral virtue.8 
My own view is that this account of moral motivation is a nonstarter – moral motivation cannot just 
be about responding to right-making reasons de re. In this paper, however, I will not attack it 
directly.9  Rather, I’m going to argue that there is no plausible of story of what right-making reasons 
are such that it yields a plausible account of moral worth. On the two most plausible ways of 
accounting for right-making reasons that have been defended in the literature, RMR accounts are 
hard pressed to avoid some very implausible consequences for which actions do and do not have 
moral worth. 
2. e First Horn of the Dilemma: Right-Making Reasons as Explanation
Perhaps the most straightforward way to cash out “right-making” is as an explanatory relation. 
Right-making reasons then are those considerations that explain why an action is right. is is the 
account of right-making reasons that Arpaly seems to have in mind. For example, she argues that 
Kant’s grocer, who deals honestly with his customers because he thinks that such a policy is most 
likely to benefit his business, is not morally praiseworthy for his action. And this is because the 
considerations that lead him to act are not those that explain why one should deal honestly with 
one’s customers: 
In pricing fairly, the grocer acts for a reason that has nothing to do with morality or with the 
features of his action that make it morally right. e reasons for which he acts have to do only 
with his own welfare; and whatever it is that makes his action morally right, the fact that his 
action increases his welfare is certainly not what makes it morally right. His reasons for action 
do not correspond to the action’s right-making features.10 
Appeals to such a notion of right-making reasons are pervasive throughout moral theory and not 
just limited to the literature on moral worth. Rosen, for example suggests:
If an act is wrong, there must be some feature of the act that makes it wrong. Any given act may 
be wrong for several reasons, and some of these reasons may be more fundamental than others. 
A breach of promise may be wrong because it is a breach of trust, and a breach of trust may be 
wrong because it is prohibited by principles for social cooperation that no one could reasonably 
reject.11
How to spell out the explanatory relation in detail has been the subject of recent debate. One 
promising line of thought is to understand the right-making relation as a specific instance of 
metaphysical grounding, where grounding is understood as a form of metaphysical dependence 
distinct from causation.12 Much recent debate is concerned with spelling out the properties of the 
grounding relation; these details need not concern us here.13 What matters is that there are 
metaphysical resources we can draw on to cash out the right-making relation as an explanatory 
relation along the lines I have suggested. 
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If this is how we spell out right-making reasons, can we accommodate actions on moral advice? e 
answer is No. Let’s focus Ron’s action. Ron cuts oﬀ funding to charity X which is, we’re assuming, 
the right thing to do. Ron makes his decision on the basis of his colleague’s moral testimony. On 
this basis, he rightly takes ending program X to be the right thing to do and this is why he goes ahead 
with it. But the fact that his colleague tells Ron that the right thing to do is to cut oﬀ funding to 
charity X does not make it the right thing to do. e right-making reasons for ending program X 
are, plausibly, nonmoral facts about the program X: facts about its eﬀectiveness, the services it oﬀers, 
how indispensable these services are, etc. But Ron is not motivated by those facts; he does not know 
how to weigh them. Instead, he is motivated by his colleague’s advice about what the right thing to 
do is. And so, Ron’s action does not have moral worth. And, for similar reasons, neither does 
Johanna’s.
One might try to resist this verdict as follows: one could argue that if Ron’s or Johanna’s advisors 
only told them what the right thing to do was and didn’t give them any justification for why it was 
the right thing to do, then indeed their actions do not have moral worth. However, she might argue, 
typically this is not what advisers do. Plausibly, Ron’s colleague will tell Ron that he needs to end 
program X because, say, it is less eﬀective than the others. In this case, Ron will be motivated by 
right-making reasons, after all. And so their actions can have moral worth. Advisors generally tell us 
not just what the right thing to do is but also what makes it right.  
I don’t find this response convincing. By relying on his colleague, Ron may well come to believe not 
only what the right thing to do is but also what the right-making reason is. But this does not mean 
that he will be motivated by the right-making reason. In particular, he will not be motivated by the 
right-making reason de re. At most he will be motivated by the fact that the program’s eﬀectiveness is a 
right-making reason. He will be motivated by the right-making reason de dicto, not de re.  
ere are two ways of bringing this out. First, note that Ron knew that program X was less eﬀective 
than the others even before asking his colleague for moral advice. And yet its being less eﬀective did 
not motivate him to end it. What then explains that his uncertainty? How do we explain why he 
only became motivated to act on this consideration after hearing his colleague’s advice? One 
possibility is that after hearing his colleague’s advice, Ron suddenly acquires a strong non-
instrumental de re desire for ending the less eﬀective program. But this seems puzzling: why would 
his colleague’s testimony lead to such a change in Ron’s desires? It seems much more plausible that 
while Ron realized that program X was less eﬀective even prior to his colleague’s testimony, he 
didn’t know that this was the right-making reason for ending the program. He was missing de dicto 
information. Based on his colleague’s testimony, he comes to know that this is the right-making 
reason and this is what motivates him to act: he is motivated by the fact that program X is less 
eﬀective qua right-making reason, i.e. de dicto, not de re.
Second, we can imagine asking Ron about why he ended program X. He might well respond that he 
ended it because it’s less eﬀective. But it does not follow that he was motivated by the fact that it’s 
less eﬀective de re. After all, suppose we follow up “But you knew it was less eﬀective all along. Why 
did you have to ask your colleague for advice then?” Presumably, Ron would respond by saying 
“Well, I knew it was less eﬀective than the other programs but I didn’t realize that this was a good 
enough reason for ending it – there were so many other considerations at issue.” at is, Ron 
himself would ultimately justify his motivation by pointing to de dicto considerations. 
e verdict that moral advice is incompatible with moral worth should strike us as both 
counterintuitive and problematic. After all, Ron and Johanna, do not rely on moral advice for 
frivolous reasons. ey are aware of their moral limitations and they care about doing what’s right. 
When they succeed in doing what’s right, it’s not by lucky accident – as in the case of the Kantian 
grocer or the shrewd politician, for whom self-interest and morality aligned. ey succeed in doing 
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what’s right because they successfully compensate for their epistemic disadvantage. is is a morally 
admirable motivation, and an account of moral worth should give them credit for it.
3. e Second Horn of the Dilemma: Right-Making Reasons as Evidence
ere is an alternative understanding of right-making reasons that looks better placed to 
accommodate actions on moral advice: perhaps, we should take right-making reasons to provide 
evidence for the moral status of an action, rather than grounding or explaining it. On this view, 
right-making reasons are whatever justifies our actions. Such an account has been defended by 
Markovits – she argues: 
e moral reasons for us to perform some action are subjective — we are morally required to do 
only what we have suﬃcient epistemic reason to believe it would be best to do, not what it 
would (in fact) be best to do.14
Such an evidential account of right-making reasons accommodates actions on moral advice as 
having moral worth. is is because testimony is a source of evidence. us, insofar as Ron’s 
colleague is trustworthy and reliable and Ron has good reason to regard her as such, her testimony 
provides Ron with evidence that ending program X is the right thing to do. And so, his colleague’s 
testimony is itself a right-making reason. As Markovits argues:
If expert testimony gives us most reason to believe that some act would be best, then this 
testimony is the reason why we should perform that act [...] our agent’s acting so may be made 
right by the fact that the agent advises him to do so.15 
So far so good. But troubling consequences quickly emerge. If right-making reasons are evidence for 
an action’s moral status, and acting on right-making reasons is suﬃcient for moral worth, then 
morally worthy actions are too easy to come by. Such an account is much too inclusive: it counts 
actions as morally praiseworthy that are both morally wrong and morally repugnant.
Imagine a situation in which the fact that an injection is more painful than the alternatives is 
evidence for its eﬀectiveness. In such a scenario, the fact that injecting you with the drug will cause 
you more pain than injecting you with an alternative can be a right-making reason. And so, a 
sadistic doctor who chooses the painful injection because it’s painful and because she non-
instrumentally cares about causing you pain is, on an evidential account of right-making reasons, 
motivated by a right-making reason. us, her action has moral worth: she is morally praiseworthy 
for injecting you with the more painful medication. is looks like a deeply implausible 
consequence.
Second, imagine Linda who grows up in a small tight-knit rural community. Her friends and 
neighbors are good people: they are honest and hard-working, they give to charity and help each 
other out. But her community is also deeply conservative and so, from an early age, Linda is taught 
that gay marriage is a grave moral evil that it’s her duty to oppose. And so, she donates money to 
various organizations that oppose gay marriage and takes part in a letter-writing campaign against 
its legalization. Linda’s belief that homosexuality is a grave moral evil is based on the testimony of 
those around her whom Linda has both good reason to regard as reliable and trustworthy. 
Moreover, these people really are, for the most part, good people even if they harbor misguided 
moral views about gay marriage. And so, it seems that Linda’s unfortunate moral belief, while false, 
may well be justified. As Markovits argues:   
[I]f the advice of the good authority provides our agent with suﬃcient evidence for the belief 
that a particular act would be best, our agent’s acting so may be made right by the fact that the 
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good authority advises him to do it – indeed, this may be true even if the authority advises him 
wrongly.16
In donating money to anti-gay marriage organizations and taking part in letter-writing campaigns, 
Linda then acts on right-making reasons. And so, Linda is morally praiseworthy for her support of 
organizations that rally against gay marriage. 
Again, this is deeply implausible. Given Linda’s sheltered upbringing, we may be willing to concede 
that she is not blameworthy for her false moral views and for acting on them. But to insist that her 
action has moral worth – that she is morally praiseworthy for donating money to organizations 
whose aim is to perpetuate discriminatory treatment based on sexual orientation – is going 
decidedly too far. 
 
Where does this leave us? I have argued that a widely shared assumption about moral motivation – 
namely that moral motivation involves being motivated by right-making reasons de re – leaves us in 
a tight spot with regards to a certain class of intuitively morally admirable actions: actions on moral 
advice. Depending on how we make right-making reasons precise, moral worth becomes either too 
hard – it excludes actions on moral advice – or too easy – we have to include the sadistic doctor’s 
giving a painful injection and misguided Linda’s supporting homophobic causes. If we take the first 
option, we have to conclude that acting on right-making reasons cannot be necessary for moral 
worth. If we opt for the second, we have to conclude that it cannot be suﬃcient. 
I suggest that this gives us good reason to look for an alternative – one that departs from the 
underlying picture of moral motivation. 
4. e Importance of Moral Knowledge
e aim of this section is to lay out an alternative approach to moral worth. Here is the proposal: 
e Knowledge Principle: An action has moral worth if and only if the agent acts from moral 
knowledge. 
I take it that an agent acts from moral knowledge if and only if she is motivated by her knowledge 
that the action is the right thing to do. In this section, I provide some positive arguments for both 
the necessity and the suﬃciency claim. In the next section I address the most pressing objection. 
e Knowledge Principle as a suﬃcient condition for moral worth is motivated by the cases of moral 
advice that I discussed in Section 1. Recall Ron and Johanna. ey are motivated to seek out moral 
advice because they recognize that (for diﬀerent reasons) they are not in a position to know what 
the right thing to do is in their situation. ey rely on moral advice because they have reason to 
think that their advisors are epistemically better placed – that they are trustworthy and reliable. 
When we are morally uncertain, then relying on moral advice is a morally good thing. Moral 
testimony can be a source of moral knowledge. us, it seems plausible that by relying on moral 
advice Ron and Johanna can come to know what the right thing to do is. And this is what motivates 
them to act: Ron, for example, ends program X because he knows this is the right thing to do.17 
If e Knowledge Principle is a suﬃcient condition for moral worth, then this explains why we regard 
Ron and Johanna as morally praiseworthy for their right actions. ey are morally praiseworthy 
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because they are motivated by their knowledge of what the right thing to do is.18 It also explains 
why they seem morally praiseworthy not just for acting on moral advice but also for seeking it out in 
the first place. When you are morally uncertain, resolving your moral uncertainty is the right thing 
to do. Plausibly, Ron and Johanna know this and this motivates them to look for reliable and 
trustworthy moral advice. And so, they are morally praiseworthy for it. 
us, one reason to regard e Knowledge Principle as a plausible suﬃcient condition is that it gives 
us an intuitively compelling way to accommodate actions on moral advice as having moral worth. A 
second reason is that an analogous condition seems suﬃcient for nonmoral praise. Suppose a doctor 
correctly treated a patient for an ear infection. And suppose that she succeeded because she knew 
that the patient had an ear infection and she knew what the right way to treat it is. is seems 
suﬃcient for us to give the doctor credit for both her correct diagnosis and the correct treatment. 
Note that we give the doctor credit for it, even if she was initially stumped by the patient’s 
symptoms and consulted a textbook for both the diagnosis and the correct treatment. Since it would 
be surprising if our practice of moral and nonmoral praise radically diverged, this gives us some 
reason to think that e Knowledge Principle may be suﬃcient for moral praise, also. 
Are there reasons for thinking that e Knowledge Principle could be a necessary condition for moral 
worth? Yes – we see this if we step back and recall a central feature of morally worthy actions: an 
agent’s action has moral worth only if it’s not a fluke that she did the right thing. e rightness of 
her action must be connected in some reliable way to her motivation, so as to make the agent’s 
doing the right thing counterfactually robust. For this reason Kant’s shopkeeper and the shrewd 
politician are not morally praiseworthy even when they do act rightly. eir motivations are self-
interested, and it’s a matter of luck that self-interest and morality align in their particular situation – 
all too often they do not. 
Moral knowledge provides such a reliable link between the rightness of an action and the agent’s 
motivation: if the agent knows that an action is right and she is motivated by this knowledge, then 
it’s not an accident that she acts rightly. is is because knowledge is counterfactually robust: if you 
know that p, then you couldn’t easily have been wrong about it.
By requiring moral knowledge for moral worth we evade the counterintuitive consequences of the 
evidential RMR account. Misguided Linda is not morally praiseworthy for donating money and 
time in order to oppose gay marriage. Even if we allow that Linda’s belief that gay marriage is a 
grave moral evil is epistemically justified, it is false. Linda does not know that gay marriage is a 
moral evil and so she doesn’t know that it’s right to oppose it. So, she cannot be motivated by her 
moral knowledge. And so, her action does not have moral worth. 
e Knowledge Principle also rightly excludes the sadistic doctor from moral praise for giving you the 
painful injection. e fact that the injection is painful may well be evidence on which the doctor can 
come to know that giving it to you is the right thing to do. But to be morally praiseworthy, it’s not 
enough that the sadistic doctor knows or is in a position to know that she ought to give you the 
injection. She needs to act on this moral knowledge: she needs to give you the painful objection 
because she knows this to be the right thing to do. at is, she needs to be motivated both by her 
knowledge of what the right thing to do is and by a desire to do what’s right. As described, however, 
the sadistic doctor is motivated by the fact that the injection is painful.
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e Knowledge Principle thus rejects the picture of moral motivation that underpins RMR accounts. 
On this picture, moral motivation was a matter of being motivated by right-making reasons de re. In 
contrast, e Knowledge Principle requires agents to be motivated by the moral status of the action: 
the agent needs to know that her action is the right thing to do and she must be motivated by a 
desire to do what’s right. 
Still, you might ask, why should knowledge be required? Would justified true belief not do? I don’t 
think it would. Consider a modified scenario involving Linda. Linda goes to a lecture about the 
morality of gay marriage and she hears one of the members of her community state what sounds 
like passionate support of gay marriage. Because Linda arrived late and is leaving early, the fact that 
the speaker is merely quoting ‘the liberal press’ eludes her. Feeling inspired, Linda makes a donation 
to a pro-same-sex marriage group when she gets home. Linda’s belief that same-sex marriage is 
morally unproblematic is true and let’s assume that we can fill in the details so that it is also 
justified. Still, I don’t think we would regard Linda as morally praiseworthy for her donation. While, 
in supporting marriage equality, she did the right thing, her success seems too fragile and accidental 
to merit moral praise. She could have very easily done the wrong thing and donated money to an 
organization opposing same-sex marriage, had she only listened to the lecture for a couple of 
minutes longer.  
 
e Knowledge Principle is attractive as an account of moral worth for two reasons. First, it 
accommodates much of the insight and appeal of both the explanatory and the evidential RMR 
account. If moral knowledge is necessary for moral worth, then being sensitive to those features that 
ground the moral status of our actions is a very good thing indeed. at’s because it’s hard to see 
how an agent could be in a position to discriminate right from wrong without being sensitive to 
these features. Similarly, if color physicalism is correct and what makes something red are its 
reflectance properties, then it’s hard to see how an agent could be in a position to reliably 
discriminate red from yellow without being sensitive to the underlying reflectance properties. e 
Knowledge Principle also accounts for the intuitive plausibility of evidential right-making reason 
accounts: moral knowledge, like all knowledge, must be based on evidence. And moral evidence may 
come in many kinds: plausibly, it includes the underlying nonmoral facts grounding its moral status, 
but it also includes moral testimony. 
 
We said that morally worthy action is supposed to reflect something good about the agent. As 
Markovits notes:
[M]orally worthy actions are the building blocks of virtue – a pattern of performing them makes 
up the life of a good person.19
A morally good person is someone who generally performs morally praiseworthy actions. is 
applies more widely than just in the moral case. Plausibly, a good doctor is someone who, in the 
context of treating her patients, generally performs actions that are medically praiseworthy. A good 
car mechanic is someone who, in the context of repairing cars, generally performs actions that are 
praiseworthy. And in these nonmoral cases, knowledge is a crucial ingredient to such praise: a good 
doctor is someone who is medically competent. She makes medical decisions that reflect her 
medical knowledge. e good car mechanic is someone who is knowledgeable about fixing cars; her 
decisions reflect her knowledge. 
Being a good doctor or a good car mechanic thus involves competence: it requires being 
knowledgeable about one’s subject matter. Why should the moral case be any diﬀerent? It seems 
natural to think that someone who is morally good is someone who is morally competent: they 
know right from wrong. Just as a good doctor is someone whom we might ask for medical advice, it 
9
19 Markovits [2010], p. 203.
is natural to think that the morally good person is someone whom we can ask for moral advice. And 
just as the good doctor’s medical decisions reflect her medical knowledge, it seems natural to 
suppose that the actions and decisions undertaken by a morally good person reflect her moral 
knowledge. 
ese arguments are hardly conclusive and much more needs to be said to fill them in.20 But I hope 
what I have said so far shows that e Knowledge Principle deserves serious consideration as a 
candidate account of moral worth. In the next section, I defend it from an influential objection.
 
5. e Knowledge Principle, Defended
e claim that moral knowledge should be a necessary condition for moral worth is widely seen as a 
nonstarter. A central reason for this is the case of Huckleberry Finn. Huckleberry Finn makes up an 
elaborate lie and thereby protects his friend, the fugitive slave Jim. But Huckleberry, it is argued, 
does not know that this is the right thing to do – in fact, he falsely believes that morality requires 
him to turn Jim over to the authorities. Still, it’s argued, Huckleberry is intuitively admirable for 
protecting the fugitive slave Jim. But then moral worth cannot require moral knowledge.21 
If Huckleberry does not know that protecting a fugitive slave is the right thing to do, then e 
Knowledge Principle does commit us to the verdict that he is not morally praiseworthy for it. But, 
contrary, to received wisdom, I argue that this is not as implausible a verdict as it is generally taken 
to be: to say that Huckleberry’s action is not morally praiseworthy is not to deny that it is admirable 
in other ways.  
Let’s consider Huckleberry’s motivation in detail. Believing that helping a fugitive slave escape is 
akin to ‘stealing’, Huckleberry was prepared to turn Jim over to the authorities. en he changes his 
mind on what to do, without changing his beliefs about slavery. What then happened? According to 
RMR accounts of moral worth, Huckleberry Finn, despite his false moral beliefs, responded to Jim’s 
humanity.22 Since Jim’s humanity is a right-making reason, Huckleberry’s case is taken to motivate 
RMR accounts of moral worth. us, Arpaly argues: 
[W]hen the opportunity comes to turn Jim in and Huckleberry experiences a strong reluctance 
to do so, his reluctance is to a large extent the result of the fact that he has come to see Jim as a 
person...23
It’s true that Huckleberry experiences a strong reluctance to turn Jim in. But I’m not sure that the 
best explanation of this is Jim’s personhood. is seems to leave out the role of Huckleberry’s 
friendship with Jim. us, consider what Jim shouted out to Huckleberry, just before Huckleberry 
wavered:
Pooty soon I’ll be a shout’n for joy, en I’ll say, it’s all on account o’ Huck; I’s a free man, en I 
couldn’t ever ben free ef it hadn’t been for Huck; Huck done it. Jim won’t ever forgit you, Huck; 
you’s de bes’ fren’ Jim’s ever had; en you’s de only fren’ ole Jim’s got now.24
It’s upon hearing Jim calling out to him that Huckleberry’s resolve melts away:
I was paddling oﬀ, all in a sweat to tell on him; but when he says this, it seemed to kind of take 
the tuck all out of me.25
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20 For more discussion, see Sliwa [ms].
21 For versions of this argument, see Arpaly [2003], Markovits [2010], Driver [2000].
22 For a similar argument, see Markovits, p. 208.
23 Arpaly [2003], p. 77.
24 Twain, p. 103.
25 ibid.
us, it seems that what was crucial for Huckleberry’s change of heart was a reminder of his 
friendship with Jim. Arpaly herself considers the importance of Huckleberry’s and Jim’s 
relationship:
Twain makes it very easy for Huckleberry to perceive the similarity between himself and Jim: 
the two are equally ignorant, share the same language and superstitions [...] While Huckleberry 
never reflects on these facts, they do prompt him to act toward Jim, more and more, in the same 
way he would have acted toward any other friend.26
But then it seems very odd to explain Huckleberry’s weakening resolve by appealing to a desire to 
protect a person. Rather, it seems likely that Huckleberry was motivated by considerations of 
friendship. After all, one of the central tenets of friendship is loyalty – you don’t just let your friends 
down when they are in need. And plausibly Huckleberry knows that. Huckleberry’s change of heart 
then is in part explained by his desire to be a good friend and his knowledge of what friendship 
requires. And so, it seems plausible that he is praiseworthy for being a good friend.  
Does Huckleberry deserve moral praise for helping his friend in need?27 It’s plausible that in the 
situation, Huckleberry is morally required to help his friend.28 It’s less clear that Huckleberry knows 
that he is morally required to help his friend. But even if Huckleberry is not morally praiseworthy 
for helping his friend, this is compatible with his being praiseworthy for being a good friend. Being 
a good friend is something that we value. And so it’s not surprising that Huckleberry’s action should 
strike us as admirable. Even if Huckleberry is precluded from moral praise by his ignorance, e 
Knowledge Principle allows that he may be praiseworthy in other, nonmoral, ways.29 And so, e 
Knowledge Principle can accommodate the intuition that there is something admirable about 
Huckleberry’s action, even if he is not morally praiseworthy for protecting a fugitive slave.    
A second reason for insisting that Huckleberry deserves moral praise for his action is the thought 
that to deny it has implausible implications for our evaluation of Huckleberry Finn. Arpaly worries 
that it commits us to seeing Huckleberry as a bad boy who just chanced upon the right action. But 
as Arpaly insists: 
Huckleberry Finn [...] is not a bad boy who has accidentally done something good, but a good 
boy. 30
e Knowledge Principle tells us how to evaluate actions, not agents. However, it’s plausible to think 
that an account of the former will have implications for the latter. e objection here is, then, that 
e Knowledge Principle has implausible implications for how we evaluate agents. 
But to deny that Huckleberry is morally praiseworthy for helping a fugitive slave is not to say that 
he is a ‘bad boy who has accidentally done something good’. e objection presents us with a false 
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27 It’s worth noting that Bennett [1974], who introduced this case to the literature did not think that Huckleberry Finn 
was morally praiseworthy for his action either, though on diﬀerent grounds. He thought Huckleberry was not 
responding to moral reasons but just acting from sympathy.
28 See Manne [forthcoming] for more discussion on this point.
29 Similarly, consider a doctor who encounters a wounded villain and, after some hesitation, saves the villain’s life. We 
can imagine that she has reached the wrong conclusion: the morally right thing would have been to let the villain die. 
On e Knowledge Principle she is thus not morally praiseworthy for saving the villain’s life. But this is not to say that 
there is nothing admirable about what she did. Insofar as she was motivated by her knowledge of what the medically 
right thing to do was, she may well deserve nonmoral credit for being a good doctor. e Knowledge Principle only rules 
out her deserving moral praise in this situation; it is compatible with her deserving medical praise. anks to John 
Brunero and Jonathan Way for pressing me on this point.  
30 Arpaly [2003], p. 78. See also Driver [2000], p. xvi for a similar point. 
dilemma. Whether an agent is morally good does not hinge on the moral worth of one individual 
action: a good doctor can sometimes be merely lucky to have made the correct medical decision – 
she rightly prescribed Tylenol for a high fever but she didn’t know the child was running a high 
fever; the thermometer was malfunctioning. Similarly a morally good agent can sometimes perform 
a right action by mere luck: she did her best and it turned out all right even though she lacked moral 
knowledge of what to do in these circumstances. 
While Huckleberry is not morally praiseworthy for protecting a fugitive slave, he plausibly is 
morally praiseworthy for plenty of other actions. Huckleberry has false beliefs about slavery but he 
shows sound moral judgment in plenty of other situations: he knows that one must keep one’s 
promises, be loyal to one’s friends, and apologize when having wronged someone. Huckleberry is 
not morally ignorant; and this is precisely what makes him a good boy. Arpaly then is right that 
Huckleberry is not a “bad boy who has accidentally done something good”; he is indeed a ‘good 
boy.’ But this is compatible with his having been lucky to avoid a serious moral mistake in this 
particular case. 
e fact that e Knowledge Principle excludes Huckleberry’s helping a fugitive slave from moral 
worth may have some intuitive cost. But I have argued that this cost has been overstated: denying 
that Huckleberry is morally praiseworthy for helping a fugitive slave does not commit us to the 
claim that there is nothing admirable about his action or that he cannot perform morally worthy 
actions on other occasions. 
Second, as we have seen, RMR accounts of moral worth come at a significant price, themselves. One 
way of spelling out such an account commits us to denying that agents can be morally praiseworthy 
for acting on sound moral advice. But moral advice is a central and pervasive part of our moral lives; 
moral practice is not an individual pursuit. We rely on various advisors (friends, family, preachers, 
sometimes the internet) to navigate dicey professional situations, diﬃcult life decisions, and tricky 
conflicts. is is a good thing: it enables us to compensate for our biases, lack of experience, or lack 
of perspective. An agent who is aware of her moral and epistemic limitations, as Ron and Johanna 
are, and compensates for them is morally admirable. To deny that such an agent deserves moral 
praise is deeply implausible. It’s to deny that humility is a virtue. And on the second way of spelling 
out an RMR account, the intuitive costs are prohibitive: however implausible it is to exclude 
Huckleberry’s action, it is certainly more implausible to maintain that the sadistic doctor and 
misguided Linda deserve moral praise.
6. Conclusion
Moral worth is widely taken to be a matter of acting “for the right reasons”. is paper has argued 
that one popular way of cashing out this claim – taking moral worth to be a matter of being 
motivated by right-making reasons – fails as an account of moral worth. RMR accounts as defended 
in recent literature, I have argued, face a dilemma over actions on sound moral advice. Agents 
sometimes are morally praiseworthy for acting on moral advice – relying on moral advice allows 
them to compensate for their moral and epistemic limitations. RMR accounts have diﬃculties 
accommodating this. If right-making reasons are those considerations that ground the moral status 
of actions, then actions on moral advice cannot have moral worth. And so, acting on right-making 
reasons cannot be necessary for moral worth. If right-making reasons are considerations that 
provide evidence for the moral status of actions, then acting on right-making reasons cannot be 
suﬃcient for moral worth. I have then explored an alternative possibility: that moral worth is a 
matter of acting on moral knowledge. I have argued that this proposal – e Knowledge Principle –  
allows us to accommodate much of the insight behind RMR accounts, while avoiding its 
counterintuitive consequences. Most importantly, it sees the practice of moral worth and moral 
goodness as continuous with nonmoral praise and goodness. Knowledge is essential to successful 
actions in nonmoral domains. Being a good doctor or a good car mechanic is a matter of being 
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knowledgeable about one’s subject matter and letting this knowledge guide one’s actions. Why think 
it should be diﬀerent in the case of morality?
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